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STUDENT NOTES
INDICTMENTS-LARCENY-DESCRIPTION OF STOLEN
ONEY.Upon a demurrer to the following indictment the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia was forced to rule upon its sufficiency. It read, "and the Grand Jurors aforesaid do further
present that on the day of November, 1921, the said A. F.
Robinson in the County aforesaid, and in the State aforesaid,
thirty-five hundred dollars ($35,000.00), the property of G. A.
Bowyer, feloniously did steal, take, and carry away, against the
peace and dignity of the State". This indictment was held bad
because of insufficient description of the property stolen. The
court held that it should have alleged that the stolen money was
lawful money of the United States, and further suggests that the
indictment should have stated whether the money stolen was coin
or paper currency - judgment reversed - defendant discharged.
(Hatcher, Judge, dissenting). State of West Virginia v. A. F.
Robinson.1

1155

S. E. 649 (1930).
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This decision is undoubtedly in accord with the Common Law
Rule.' American decisions on this question in the absence of
statutes have almost uniformly followed the early Common Law
of England, seemingly trusting to its appropriateness because of
its antiquity without seriously considering its adaptability to conditions in the new world.8 Judge Hatcher suggests that when this
rule was formulated in England requiring indictments to state
the "nationality" of money it possibly served a useful purpose
because at that time, we are told, soldiers were returning from
Continental wars, sailors and traders were returning from ports
of foreign countries and because of no well developed system of
foreign exchange this money was put in circulation in England.
Consequently in speaking of money in those days it was necessary
to designate its kind, because the word, money, might refer to any
one of a dozen different varieties. Then it would seem there was
good cause to require an indictment for the larceny of money to
designate its "nationality" in order to enable a plea of res judicata
from the description therein contained, and also to enable the one
accused to prepare his defense properly, then the description was
unmistakably a matter of substance and its omission would rightly
make an indictment bad; but without settling the reason for the
rule in England, and conceding its usefulness there, it does not
follow that it should be applied in this state unless conditions are
the same. An early West Virginia case held that "The Common
Law of England is in force in this state only so far as it is in
harmony with its institutions and its principles applicable to the
state of the Country and the condition of society".' This case
would indicate that the rule of common law in question in this
case was never intended to be forced upon the courts of this state.
Certainly conditions are much different here from what they were
in England-we are an inland state, engaged in no foreign wars
or commerce, foreign money here is an object of extreme curiosity;
in England it was common. Here "whenever the word dollar is
mentioned it always means one and the same thing, the monetary
unit of the lawful currency of the United States."' Here we con2-Note (1912) 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 933.
8Merwin v. People, 26 Mich. 298, 12 Am. Rep. 314 (1873).
'Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1 (1871).
5 State v. Robinson, supra n. 1, Judge Hatcher's dissent, p. 651. Cf. United
States v. Van Auken, 96 U. S. 366, 380, 24 L. ed. 852 (1877). "A dollar is
the unit of our currency, it always means money or what is regarded as
money-. Cf. Halstead v. Meeker, 18 N. J. Eq. 136, 139 (1866). "There is no
ambiguity in the word Dollars. If any word has a settled meaning at law and
in the courts, it is this. It can only mean the legal currency of the United
States".
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tract with reference to payment in dollars; every monetary transaction is carried on with reference to dollars and at no time when
we speak of dollars do we feel it necessary to explain that we refer to United States currency. The word, dollar, to us has as
definite a meaning as the word, chicken, and it is no more necessary when you use the word dollar to say United States money,
than it is when you use the word, chicken, to say an animal with
two legs. Therefore, does it not follow that since the word, dollar,
has in this state such an implied meaning in our statute books, in
the social and business world, that it should have the same meaning by implication when found in an indictment '. Thus since the
meaning of the word, dollar, follows it into the indictment by
way of implication it is there in substance and for the court to
insist upon the descriptive words to be physically there in form,
when they in no way add to the meaning, is to insist upon sheer
technicality. It is to insist that surplusage be incorporated in the
indictment.'
The writer's belief that the courts are unusually and unnecessarily technical at this point is strengthened when it is observed
how courts allow implied meanings in other situations.
1.
2.

3.

Where money stolen is described as United States money
the value is implied and this we see is very important because upon the value depends the degree of the crime.'
It is generally conceded that where the Grand Jury does
not know the nationality of the money and so states in
the indictment, that the indictment will not be held bad.'
Does this not go to show that it is form rather than substance, because if substance certainly the indictment could
not be held good and the defendant made to suffer simply
because the Grand Jury alleged ignorance of the facts?
If it were really substance, of course, the indictment
should in such a case be held bad.
Where coins are stolen it is not necessary to allege the
nationality. In United States v. Rigsby it was held in

0"Law is or should be a practical matter". 2

MODE N LEGAL PHIMoSOPRY

SERiEs 386 (1912)

quoted in Judge Hatcher's dessenting opinion, State v.
Robinson, supra p. 651.
'To aver the value of United States currency was held to be surplusage,
its value being implied. ENCY. OF FoRmS AND PRECEDENTS Vol. 11, p. 245;
cited in Judge Hatcher's dissenting opinion, State v. Robinson, supra n. 1,
p. 651. Also State v. Walker, 22 La. Ann. 425 (1870).
,Supra n. 7.
0 Where the Grand Jury allege they do not know the kind of money an
indictment is good without it. People v. Hunt, 251 Ill. 446, 96 N. E. 220
(1911); Leonard v. State, 115 Ala. 80, 22 So. 564 (1897); Enson v. State,
58 Fla. 37, 50 So. 948 (1909); Brown v. People, 29 Mich. 232 (1874); People
v. Dimick, 107 N. Y. 13, 14 N. E. 178 (1887).
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an indictment for larceny "one silver coin of the value
of 50 cents is a sufficient description of the property
stolen"."
In State v. Green, a Louisiana case, it was held an indictment
for stealing $75 the property of, naming the owner, is good so
far as the description of the stolen property is concerned. To
allege whtat kind of dollars taken was held unnecessary. It is
submitted by the writer that the Louisiana view, as expressed in
this case, is preferable and more in keeping with justice and the
needs of the times.
The suggestion made by the court that the indictment should
have stated whether the money stolen was paper money or coin
seems equally unsubstantial, because since to us the word dollar
means a dollar of United States money the value is implied and
is the same as the number of dollars stolen. Then, to charge a
defendant with the larceny of $3500 would certainly be to charge
him with a substantial crime and it is held that where an indictment does charge a substantial crime, then according to the case
of State v. Counts a bill of particulars is available for the purpose
of furnishing details omitted from the accusation or indictment to
which the defendant is entitled before trial.' Again in Commonwealth v. Wood' it is said "If the indictment fails to set forth
the charges with reasonable certainty, the court in the exercise of
a sound discretion will direct a bill of particulars". Finally in
the case of United States v. Bayard" it is said, "a bill of particulars is an answer to the suggestion that the indictment is not sufficiently definite to allow the defendant to plead the acquittal or
conviction as res judicata upon a second charge for the same offense".
Would it not seem that since the nationality of the money is
implied, and a bill of particulars can be supplied furnishing the
necessary details of the offense that this indictment is sufficient?
It has been said that "no greater particularity is required in an
indictment than to express the same fact in everyday parlance"."
"Fed. Cas. No. 16,163, 2 Cranch C. C. 606 (1822); Conunonwealth v. Gallagher, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 240 (1860); United States v. Baney, Fed. Cas.
No. 14,530, 4 Cranch C. C. 606 (1835).
n27 La. Ann. (1875); State v. Walker, 22 La. Ann. 425 (1870).
2290
W. Va. 342, 110 S. E. 812 (1922); State v. Lewis, 69 W. Va. 472,
72 S. E. 1025 (1911). Under an indictment for simple larceny a bill of
particulars is permissible to prove the character of the larceny.
2370 Mass. (4 Gray) 11 t1855).
"116 Fed. 376 (1883).
1312 STRAND ENCY. PRo. 304 note (a), cited in Judge Hatcher's dissenting
opinion, State v. Robinson supra p. 651.
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Besides "an accused is only entitled to such particularity of allegation as may be of service to him in enabling him to understand the
charge and to prepare his defense"."
If the objection to this indictment is, as is believed, technical
should it be tolerated contrary to our reason mainly because an
inappropriate and antiquated rule of common law has so decreed?
Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "We must beware of the pitfalls of
antiquarianism and must remember that for our purposes our
only interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the
present".7
If we admit the indictment is proper and that the rule which
would exclude it is bad we may achieve the correct result in either
of two ways. First, by holding that since the objection is technical,
an overnicety of the common law, that it is cured by our criminal
statute of jeofails;" or secondly, and preferably, by refusing to
be bound by the strict rule of stare decisis and instead recognizing
that the common law "is a living organism that grows and moves
in response to the larger and fuller development of the nation'".
When thus free to decide the question unfettered a decision could
be rendered based upon reason, "the accepted social standards or
the mores of the times".' Does the ruling in this case not sacrifice the spirit of the law in order to keep it's letter? Does this
ruling not give the criminal more protection than he deserves?
Unfortunately, to the mind of the writer, the court did not see
it so and as the case now stands reversed and as it is believed upon
a technicality it will without guaranteeing the accused any needed
protection subject the state to additional expense for an unnecessary trial, besides bringing the law and the courts into greater
disrepute among the laymen of the commonwealth. "There is no
doubt that if the law and the interpretation and application of the
law are in harmony with (present day) prevailing views of justice
society will be more inclined to obey the law".'
-JACK

D.

JENNINGS.

10 Commonwealth

v. Robertson, 162 Mass. 90, 38 N. E. 25 (1893).
10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469.
'SW. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes 1923), e. 155, § § 10, 11.
20Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. J. 156, 140 N. E. 257 (1923).
)Hardman, Stare Deciss and the Modern Trend (1926) 32 W. VA. L.
163, 188.
" Ibid, at p. 189.
17Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897)
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